[ovs-dev] [PATCH v2 2/2] datapath: Add Stateless TCP Tunneling protocol.

Jesse Gross jesse at nicira.com
Wed Apr 1 00:07:25 UTC 2015


On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 4:41 PM, Pravin B Shelar <pshelar at nicira.com> wrote:
> diff --git a/datapath/datapath.c b/datapath/datapath.c
> index 7f431ed..ea9c6ae 100644
> --- a/datapath/datapath.c
> +++ b/datapath/datapath.c
> @@ -2192,6 +2192,7 @@ static int __net_init ovs_init_net(struct net *net)
>
>         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ovs_net->dps);
>         INIT_WORK(&ovs_net->dp_notify_work, ovs_dp_notify_wq);
> +       INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ovs_net->vport_net.stt_sock_list);
>         return 0;
>  }
>

In this previous version, this was a little bit more self contained.
Did you run into a problem with that? If not, the other version seems
a little cleaner to me, especially since this won't be upstream and so
the less invasive it is, the better.

> diff --git a/datapath/linux/compat/stt.c b/datapath/linux/compat/stt.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..df643de
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/datapath/linux/compat/stt.c
> +static void copy_skb_metadata(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from)
> +{
> +       to->tstamp = from->tstamp;
> +       to->priority = from->priority;
> +       to->mark = from->mark;
> +       to->vlan_tci = from->vlan_tci;
> +       skb_copy_secmark(to, from);
> +}

Is there any other metadata that we might need? What about vlan_proto?
(I think we also need to check/set this when encapsulating and
decapsulating.)

> +static bool __linearize(struct sk_buff *head, bool ipv4, bool tcp, bool csum_partial)

I might call this need_linearize() or similar, since it doesn't
actually do any linearization.

> +static int skb_list_linearize(struct sk_buff *head, gfp_t gfp_mask)
> +{
> +       struct sk_buff *skb;
> +       int tlen = 0;
> +       int err;
> +
> +       skb = head;
> +       while (skb) {
> +               tlen += skb->len;
> +               skb = skb->next;
> +       }
> +
> +       err = pskb_expand_head(head, 0, tlen, gfp_mask);
> +       if (err)
> +               return err;

I think this includes the length of head in tlen, which is probably
not necessary.

> +static int __segment_skb(struct sk_buff **headp, bool ipv4, bool tcp, bool csum_partial, int l4_offset)
> +{
> +       int err;
> +
> +       err = straighten_frag_list(headp);
> +       if (unlikely(err))
> +               return err;
> +
> +       if (__linearize(*headp, ipv4, tcp, csum_partial))
> +               return skb_list_linearize(*headp, GFP_ATOMIC);

I don't think this check is in the right place. The conditions for
linearizing only come into play if we can't fully coalesce things and
would otherwise generate a frag_list. But we don't know that before
trying to coalesce.

> +static struct sk_buff *push_stt_header(struct sk_buff *head, __be64 tun_id,
> +                                      __be16 s_port, __be16 d_port,
> +                                      __be32 saddr, __be32 dst,
> +                                      __be16 h_proto, u8 nw_proto,
> +                                      int dst_mtu)
> +{
> +       struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> +       if (skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list) {
> +               bool ipv4 = (h_proto == htons(ETH_P_IP));
> +               bool tcp = (nw_proto == IPPROTO_TCP);
> +               bool csum_partial = (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL);
> +               int l4_offset = skb_transport_offset(head);
> +
> +               if (unlikely(__segment_skb(&head, ipv4, tcp,
> +                                          csum_partial, l4_offset))) {
> +                       goto error;

My guess is that not all of the conditions in __linearize apply to the
transmit case (such as the one about offloading). It's worth checking.

At a higher level, is there a reason why STT is special in this regard
as far as inserting a header into a packet that has a frag_list? Don't
other tunnels need to deal with it?

> +static bool stt_can_offload(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 h_proto, u8 nw_proto)
> +{

We probably should have a more direct check for GSO types in here. We
specifically check for SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN but a whitelist is better than
a blacklist. I think the tunnel offloads are already a problem is
somebody tries to do double encapsulation.

> +int stt_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct rtable *rt,
> +                __be32 src, __be32 dst, __u8 tos,
> +                __u8 ttl, __be16 df, __be16 src_port, __be16 dst_port,
> +                __be64 tun_id)
> +{
[...]
> +       if (!stt_can_offload(skb, inner_h_proto, inner_nw_proto)) {
> +               struct sk_buff *nskb;
> +
> +               nskb = handle_offloads(skb);
> +               if (IS_ERR(nskb)) {
> +                       ret = PTR_ERR(nskb);
> +                       goto err_free_rt;
> +               }
> +               skb = nskb;

We might have an issue with MPLS here - it wasn't available yet in 3.5
so skb_gso_segment() will choke on it (we have backports but they
don't run in direct calls to skb_gso_segment()).

vlans should be OK by this kernel version, although we'll need to push
vlans with non-standard EtherTypes into the packet.

> +static void stt_rcv(struct stt_sock *stt_sock, struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
[...]
> +       if (unlikely(stt_hdr(skb)->version != 0))
> +               goto drop;

Does this need to do a pskb_may_pull() first?

> +       err = iptunnel_pull_header(skb,
> +                                  sizeof(struct stthdr) + STT_ETH_PAD,
> +                                  htons(ETH_P_TEB));
> +       if (unlikely(err))
> +               goto drop;
> +
> +       if (unlikely(!set_offloads(skb)))
> +               goto drop;
>

I don't think the above operations are legal to do on an skb that
hasn't been merged yet. If the header spans STT segments, they will
fail even if it shouldn't.

> diff --git a/datapath/vport.c b/datapath/vport.c
> index 5a7067b..697ee6a 100644
> --- a/datapath/vport.c
> +++ b/datapath/vport.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #include <linux/compat.h>
>  #include <linux/version.h>
>  #include <net/net_namespace.h>
> +#include <net/stt.h>

I think STT internals probably don't need to leak into vport through
the header file.

> diff --git a/vswitchd/vswitch.xml b/vswitchd/vswitch.xml
> index 81e8b3f..d6cb443 100644
> --- a/vswitchd/vswitch.xml
> +++ b/vswitchd/vswitch.xml
> @@ -1863,6 +1863,17 @@
>              </p>
>            </dd>
>
> +          <dt><code>stt</code></dt>
> +          <dd>
> +             The Stateless TCP Tunnel (STT) protocol encapsulates traffic in
> +             IPv4/TCP packets.  All traffic uses a default destination port of 7471.
> +             The STT protocol does not engage in the usual TCP 3-way handshake,
> +             so it will have difficulty traversing stateful firewalls. Therefore
> +             it is better suited for hypervisor to hypervisor tunneling within
> +             data center.
> +             STT is only available in kernel datapath on kernel 3.5 or newer.
> +          </dd>

Can you make the documentation a little more descriptive of the protocol?



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