[ovs-dev] [PATCH] datapath: Fix for force/commit action failures

Greg Rose gvrose8192 at gmail.com
Thu Jul 13 18:01:08 UTC 2017


On 07/13/2017 10:46 AM, Joe Stringer wrote:
> On 13 July 2017 at 09:25, Greg Rose <gvrose8192 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> When there is an established connection in direction A->B, it is
>> possible to receive a packet on port B which then executes
>> ct(commit,force) without first performing ct() - ie, a lookup.
>> In this case, we would expect that this packet can delete the existing
>> entry so that we can commit a connection with direction B->A. However,
>> currently we only perform a check in skb_nfct_cached() for whether
>> OVS_CS_F_TRACKED is set and OVS_CS_F_INVALID is not set, ie that a
>> lookup previously occurred. In the above scenario, a lookup has not
>> occurred but we should still be able to statelessly look up the
>> existing entry and potentially delete the entry if it is in the
>> opposite direction.
>>
>> This patch extends the check to also hint that if the action has the
>> force flag set, then we will lookup the existing entry so that the
>> force check at the end of skb_nfct_cached has the ability to delete
>> the connection.
>>
>> CC: dev at openvswitch.org
>> CC: Pravin Shalar <pshelar at nicira.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe at ovn.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <gvrose8192 at gmail.com>
>> ---
> 
> A couple more administrative notes, on netdev the module name in the
> patch subject for openvswitch is "openvswitch" rather than datapath;

Right you are.

> and patches rather than having just "PATCH" as the subject prefix
> should state the tree. In this case, it's a bugfix so it should be
> "PATCH net".

I knew that... forgot the format patch option to add it.  Net-next
is closed so that would be mandatory.

  Furthermore, if you're able to figure out which commit
> introduced the issue (I believe it's introduced by the force commit
> patch), then you should place the "Fixes: " tag. I can give you some
> pointers off-list on how to do this (git blame and some basic
> formatting of the targeted patch should do the trick - this tag
> expects a 12-digit hash).
> 
> For reference, I ended up looking it up during review, this is the
> line you'd add:
> Fixes: dd41d33f0b03 ("openvswitch: Add force commit.")

Oh, thanks!

> 
>>   net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 12 ++++++++----
>>   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
>> index 08679eb..9041cf8 100644
>> --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
>> +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
>> @@ -641,17 +641,21 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(struct net *net,
>>          ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
>>          /* If no ct, check if we have evidence that an existing conntrack entry
>>           * might be found for this skb.  This happens when we lose a skb->_nfct
>> -        * due to an upcall.  If the connection was not confirmed, it is not
>> -        * cached and needs to be run through conntrack again.
>> +        * due to an upcall, or if the direction is being forced.  If the
>> +        * connection was not confirmed, it is not cached and needs to be run
>> +        * through conntrack again.
>>           */
>> -       if (!ct && key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED &&
>> +       if ((!ct && (key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED) &&
>>              !(key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_INVALID) &&
>> -           key->ct_zone == info->zone.id) {
>> +            key->ct_zone == info->zone.id) ||
>> +            (!key->ct_state && info->force)) {
>>                  ct = ovs_ct_find_existing(net, &info->zone, info->family, skb,
>>                                            !!(key->ct_state
>>                                               & OVS_CS_F_NAT_MASK));
>>                  if (ct)
>>                          nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
>> +               else
>> +                       return false;
>>          }
>>          if (!ct)
>>                  return false;
> 
> I was just wondering if this has the potential to prevent
> nf_conntrack_in() from being called at all in this case, which is also
> not quite right. In the original case of (!ct && (key->ct_state &
> OVS_CS_F_TRACKED) && !(key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED)), which I'll
> refer to as "ct_executed", we explicitly want to avoid running
> nf_conntrack_in() if we already ran it, because the connection tracker
> doesn't expect to see the same packet twice (there's also things like
> stats/accounting, and potentially L4 state machines that could get
> messed up by multiple calls). By the time the info->force and
> direction check happens at the end of the function, "ct_executed" is
> implied to be true. However, in this new case, ct_executed is actually
> false - because there was no ct() before the ct(force,commit). In this
> case, we only want to look up the existing entry to see if it should
> be deleted; if it should not be deleted, then we still haven't yet
> done the nf_conntrack_in() call so we should return false and the
> caller, __ovs_ct_lookup() should make the call to nf_conntrack_in().
> 
> What I mean is something like the following incremental on your patch:
> 
> diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
> index 9041cf8b822f..98783f114824 100644
> --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
> +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
> @@ -637,6 +637,7 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(struct net *net,
> {
>         enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
>         struct nf_conn *ct;
> +       bool ct_executed;
> 
>         ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
>         /* If no ct, check if we have evidence that an existing conntrack entry
> @@ -645,10 +646,10 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(struct net *net,
>          * connection was not confirmed, it is not cached and needs to be run
>          * through conntrack again.
>          */
> -       if ((!ct && (key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED) &&
> -           !(key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_INVALID) &&
> -            key->ct_zone == info->zone.id) ||
> -            (!key->ct_state && info->force)) {
> +       ct_executed = key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED &&
> +                     !(key->ct_state & OVS_CS_F_INVALID) &&
> +                     key->ct_zone == info->zone.id;
> +       if (!ct && (ct_executed || (!key->ct_state && info->force))) {

All the conditional cases are really ugly and tough to follow but you know
this code better than I do so let me try this out and see if it works to
fix the specific bug I'm focused on.

Thanks,

- Greg


>                 ct = ovs_ct_find_existing(net, &info->zone, info->family, skb,
>                                           !!(key->ct_state
>                                              & OVS_CS_F_NAT_MASK));
> @@ -683,7 +684,7 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(struct net *net,
>                 return false;
>         }
> 
> -       return true;
> +       return ct_executed;
> }
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED
> 



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